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ABSTRACT
The United States came close to complete autarky in 1808 as a result of a self-imposed embargo
on international shipping from December 1807 to March 1809. Monthly prices of exported and imported
goods reveal the embargo’s striking effect on commodity markets and allow a calculation of its welfare
effects. A simple general equilibrium calculation suggests that the embargo cost about 8 percent of
America’s 1807 GNP, at a time when the trade share was about 13 percent (domestic exports and
shipping earnings). The welfare cost was lower than the trade share because the embargo did not
completely eliminate trade and because domestic producers successfully shifted production toward
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The Welfare Cost of Autarky:
Evidence from the Jeffersonian Trade Embargo, 1807-1809 
1.  Introduction
In theory, the gains from international trade are represented by comparing welfare at the
free trade equilibrium with welfare at the autarky equilibrium.  In practice, such a comparison is
almost never feasible because the autarky equilibrium is almost never observed, except in unique
cases.  One such case is Japan’s dramatic opening to the world economy in the 1850s, in which
domestic and world prices on comparable commodities exist for the period of Japanese autarky
and later free trade.
1  Another exceptional instance is the United States during the period from
December 1807 to March 1809, when Congress imposed a nearly complete embargo on
international commerce at the request of President Thomas Jefferson.  Unlike many trade
embargos, this one almost completely eliminated trade and was not compromised by widespread
smuggling. 
The Jeffersonian trade embargo provides a rare opportunity – a “natural experiment” if
you will – to observe the effects of a nearly complete (albeit short-lived) elimination of
international trade.  The main objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of the embargo
on the U.S. economy, such as its effect on the prices of traded goods and the degree of import
substitution, as well as provide a rough calculation of its welfare cost.  Section 2 provides some
historical background on the embargo and describes its effect on trade.   Section 3 sets out the
simple general equilibrium framework for evaluating the welfare effects of the embargo and
describes the data used to provide an estimate of the overall cost of approaching autarky.  The- 2 -
2  For background, see Hickey (1981).
results suggest that the welfare cost of the embargo was about 5 percent of GNP in 1807, a time
when the ratio of exports to GNP was about 13 percent.  Along with the embargo’s immediate
failure to achieve its objective of softening Britain’s policies toward neutral shipping, the high
economic cost of the measure helped persuade Congress to repeal it in March 1809, just fourteen
months after its imposition.  Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2.  Historical Background
The first decade of the nineteenth century was marred by near constant military conflict
between Britain and France in the Napoleonic Wars.  As part of the war, Britain sought to
blockade the continent and to enforce this blockade by stopping the shipping of neutral
countries, especially the United States.  The British navy patrolled the eastern U.S. coast and
regularly intercepted American vessels, conducted searches and seizures, confiscated ships,
cargo, and other property, and even impressed sailors (said to be British subjects) who were
evading military service.  (France engaged in similar activities, but less intensely than Britain.) 
American frustration over these actions steadily grew over time, but the United States had few
alternatives to deal with the situation.  The main options were continued submission to the
British actions, declaring war on Britain in an attempt to force them to respect American
shipping, or enacting an embargo to safeguard American property and impose an economic
penalty on Britain.
2
After several provocations by Britain, the Jefferson administration opted for an embargo,
not only to protect domestic vessels and sailors from possible seizure, but to inflict economic- 3 -
3  Although foreign ships were permitted to bring goods to the United States, few did so
during the embargo because they would have had to return empty.  In addition, the non-
intercourse law prohibited the importation of many British manufactured goods.
4  “The ships and brigs which carried on the greater part of the transatlantic trade were in
general tied up in obedience to the Embargo, or they went down the coast to load goods in
readiness for the day when the light would change from red to green, and then returned to
anchorage in their home ports. . . . So far as the western hemisphere was concerned, smuggling
and embargo-breaking could not be prevented; but against Europe the Embargo was largely
effective.  And if American ships did not go to Europe, British goods could not be brought back
in them.”  Heaton (1941), p. 189.  Virtually all of U.S. imports from Britain arrived on American
vessels during this era.
costs on Britain in the hope of forcing them to change their policy.  In December 1807, President
Jefferson requested that Congress enact a general embargo, and Congress quickly prohibited all
American ships from sailing to foreign ports and foreign ships from taking on any cargo in the
United States.
3  Almost all accounts of the embargo considered it to have been effective, at least
initially.  Very few American vessels appeared in European ports in 1808.  Figure 1 presents the
tonnage of American ships entering into British ports during the period from 1801 to 1810.
While the tonnage entering in 1808 is not zero, that volume fell 80 percent from the previous
year.  
According to Heaton (1941, p. 189), there was “little effort to indulge in large-scale
defiance of the Embargo, at least until the end of 1808, when patience was becoming exhausted
and repeal seemed inevitable.”
4  Although the data underlying Figure 1 are not available on a
monthly basis, the American tonnage entering Britain is likely to have been concentrated late in
1808.  Late in that year, frustration with the embargo was high, its termination was widely
anticipated, and merchants were increasingly tempted to ignore it.  After carefully comparing
U.S. and British price data and considering other quantity measures of direct and indirect trade- 4 -
5  The embargo was replaced by non-intercourse act that continued to prohibit trade with
Britain, France, and their colonies and dependencies.  Over the next four years, through the War
of 1812 until the Treaty of Ghent in 1813, trade was subject to varying degrees of formal
restriction, but none as draconian as the earlier embargo.   
6  However, a later non-importation measure in 1811 coincided with an economic
downturn in Britain and apparently contributed to the British decision to lift some of its
draconian measures regarding American shipping.  See Irwin (2002).  
between the two countries, Frankel (1982, p. 308) concludes that, although smuggling existed, it
was small:  “the Embargo was well-enforced, so each country [the United States and Great
Britain] was reduced practically to autarky vis-a-vis the other.”  There are many reports of
smuggling activity across Lake Champlain into Canada, but it is not believed that the volume of
such traffic was very significant. 
The highly controversial embargo was in effect for just fourteen months.  Growing
domestic opposition to the trade restrictions, particularly in New England, forced Congress to
repeal the measure in March 1809.
5  The consensus among historians is that the embargo failed
to achieve its objective because Britain and France refused to change their policies regarding
American shipping.  This was not due to the failure to eliminate trade, but the failure of the trade
measures to weaken the political resolve in Britain to suppress neutral shipping in its effort to
strangle the French economy.
6  
Although it did not completely eliminate U.S. trade, the embargo succeeded in having a
dramatic effect on commerce.  Figure 2 shows the value of total U.S. merchandise trade
(merchandise exports of domestic produce plus re-exports, and imports) from 1800 to 1815. 
Table 1 presents more detailed trade data for the years around 1807.  The value of merchandise
exports of domestic produce fell from $49 million in 1807 to $9 million in 1808, a decline of- 5 -
over 80 percent.  Net shipping earnings fell considerably less, by 45 percent, such that total
export earnings dropped 64 percent.  Meanwhile, the value of imports for domestic consumption
fell from $85 million in 1807 to $45 million in 1808, a decline of nearly 50 percent.  These
figures understate the impact of the embargo, however, because the government’s trade statistics
were collected for the fiscal year, not for the calendar year.  Therefore, the figures for 1808 refer
to the period from October 1, 1807 to September 30, 1808, and thus include three months in
which the embargo was not in effect.  
Exports fell more sharply than imports in 1808 because of the timing of the embargo and
its effect on trans-Atlantic shipping (Heaton 1941, p. 190).  After December 1807, no American
ship was allowed to leave the United States for a foreign destination.  However, many American
vessels were then in British ports, where they would typically spend the winter months.  To
encourage these ships to return home, Congress allowed merchants to bring into the country
previously purchased foreign goods.  Thus, American ships returning from Europe in the spring
and summer of 1808 were permitted to unload their cargoes, but were not then permitted to
return to Europe.  (Most ships involved in the trans-Atlantic trade made two round trips during
the sailing season.)  As a result, exports fell immediately upon the imposition of the embargo
(because there could be no spring exports) and remained low throughout the year.  By late 1808
and early 1809, as disregard for the embargo increased, some ships left U.S. ports in violation of
the law.  On the other hand, imports did not fall as much because of the spring and summer ship
arrivals from Europe.  But after that, few ships with foreign cargo arrived in the United States.  
The embargo had a dramatic impact on prices in the United States, driving down the
domestic prices of exported goods and driving up the domestic prices of imported goods.   Figure- 6 -
7  The price data are in Cole (1938).  The weights are 43 percent for cotton, 33 percent for
flour, 17 percent for tobacco, and 7 percent for rice, and come from Pitkin (1816). 
8  In Philadelphia, “The peak of prices for imported commodities occurred in March
1809, the month the embargo was repealed.  At the time the index for imported commodities was
34.4 percent above the low of July 1807.”  Bezanson, Gray, and Hussey (1936), p. 143.
3 presents the domestic prices of the four leading U.S. commodity exports on a monthly basis
from 1807 through 1809.  Together, these four commodities – raw cotton, flour, tobacco, and
rice – accounted for about two-thirds of U.S. exports of domestic produce in 1807.  Their prices
fell sharply in early 1808, consistent with the previous discussion of how the embargo affected
exports immediately by prohibiting American ships from departing for foreign ports.  The
export-weighted average of the domestic prices of these commodities fell by about 27 percent
between December 1807 to June 1808.
7  Prices bottomed out in the summer of 1808 and even
began to recover toward the end of the year.  This is consistent with the evidence that merchants
were willing to violate the embargo as time went on.  
Unlike exports, U.S. imports were highly diversified and were not concentrated in just a
few key commodities.  Figure 4 presents two price indexes for imported commodities in Boston
and Philadelphia during this period.  Both indexes show that prices of imported goods failed to
rise in the spring of 1808, probably because imports continued to arrive in the port cities.  Prices
began to shoot up by the fall of 1808, as the number of ships entering U.S. ports fell to a trickle
and imports became increasingly scarce.  The price of imported commodities rose by about a
third as a result of the embargo: the index of wholesale prices rose 33.9 percent in Boston and
31.1 percent in Philadelphia between December 1807 and March 1809.
8  Prices peaked around
the time the embargo was lifted in early 1809, and fell rapidly once trade was resumed. - 7 -
9  Figure 1 shows that the value of trade was lower in 1814 than in 1808, but this was due
as much to the war with Britain as to any formal policy measure.  The calculations below will
focus on the shock between 1807 and 1808, two adjacent years in which the effects of policy can
be most clearly identified.  
In terms of its effect on import and export prices, therefore, the embargo was roughly
equivalent to at least a 60 percent import tariff, perhaps larger if the United States was not a
small country and could affect world prices.  Although it did not reach the point of complete
autarky as a result of the embargo, the United States was by mid- to late-1808 about as close to
being fully shut off from international commerce as it has ever been in its history.
9  How much of
the gains from trade were sacrificed in this policy action? 
3.  Assessing the Gains from Trade
This section sets out the simple general equilibrium framework that will be used to
calculate the welfare cost of the Jeffersonian trade embargo.  The gains from trade can be
represented by the difference in the utility level associated with the free trade consumption
bundle and the utility level associated with the autarky production bundle.  Following Grinols
and Wong (1991), the compensating variation change in welfare from an initial trading situation
(subscripted 0) to another (subscripted 1) can be expressed using the expenditure function:
(1) )W = e(p1, u1) - e(p1, u0).
By the definition of the expenditure function, 
(2) e(p1, u1) / p1@x1 = p1@y1 + (p1 - p1*)@m1 + B1,
where x is the vector of consumption, y is the vector of production, m is the vector of trade (mi /
xi - yi, such that imports are positive and exports are negative), p is the vector of domestic prices,- 8 -
p* is the vector of world prices, B is any net transfers or borrowing from foreigners, and ‘@’
denotes the inner product.  Equation (2) states that the value of consumption is equal to the value
of production plus tariff revenue -- represented by (p1 - p1*)@m1 -- plus transfers.  As Grinols and
Wong show, the change in welfare can be rewritten as:
(3) )W = (p1 - p1*)@(m1 - m0) + (p1* - p0*)@(- m0) + (B1 - B0) + sC + sP,
where the terms sC and sP represent the substitution effects in consumption and production as a
result of the change in relative prices.  Specifically, sC = p1@x0 - e(p1, u0) and sP = p1@(y1 - y0), and
these substitution effects are non-negative (sC $0, sP $0) if price-taking consumers optimize
subject to a budget constraint and price-taking producers maximize profits.  Equation (3) can
also be rewritten in terms of domestic prices as:
(4) )W = (p1 - p1*)@m1 + p1@(- m0) + B1 + sC + sP.
  In the case where there are no international transfers and where the embargo is
completely effective (such that m1 is zero and the country is in autarky), this expression
simplifies to three terms:  p1@(- m0), sC, and sP.  Figure 5 illustrates these three components
graphically.  The free trade situation consists of production at the point where the initial relative
price line p0 is tangent to the production possibility frontier, and consumption at the point where
p0 is tangent to the indifference curve U0.  If all trade is eliminated, domestic prices become p1,
where the utility level U1 is tangent to the production possibility frontier.  The compensating
variation welfare cost of eliminating trade and moving to autarky is represented by the distance
between the indifference curves U0 - U1, evaluated at domestic prices p1.  
Thus, the change in welfare is equal to the distance BC, i.e., )W = BC.  This can be
decomposed as BC = AD - AB - CD, where AD represents the value p1@m0, AB is  p1@x0 - e(p1, u0)- 9 -
= sC, and CD is p1@(y1 - y0) = sP.  In other words, AD is the value of the previous volume of trade
at autarky prices, AB is the substitution in consumption and CD is the substitution in production
as a result of the change in relative prices.  AD represents p1@m0 because DE is the value of
previous exports at autarky prices and AE is the value of previous imports at autarky prices, so
that AE - DE = AD (since by definition imports are positive and exports are negative).
Equation (4) is a general formulation for a change in welfare and does not assume that all
trade is eliminated.  In principle, each component of the equation can be calculated.  In the
present case, the subscript 0 will refer to the pre-embargo (1807) situation and the subscript 1
will refer to the embargo (1808) period.  Although data on U.S. trade in the early nineteenth
century is scanty, let alone data on production and consumption, sufficient data exists to generate
an approximate calculation of most components of equation (4).  The calculation of each
component deserves some discussion. 
AD:  -p1@m0 
This is the most readily calculated component of the welfare change.  We observe p0@m0,
which is simply the value of trade in 1807.  The initial price vector is normalized to unity, such
that p0 = (1, 1, 1, 1) and m0 = (-48.7, -42.1, 34.0, 51.1), where the vector elements are exports of
domestic produce, shipping earnings, imports for consumption paying ad valorem duties, and
imports for consumption paying specific duties.  (This distinction among imports will be
important for reasons that will become clear in the next calculation.)  Re-exports have been
excluded from the calculation because the gains that accrued to the United States from such trade
is reflected solely in shipping earnings.
In the vector m0, the values for domestic exports and shipping earnings are taken straight- 10 -
10  “The valuable articles of colonial produce, such as sugar, coffee, spirits, cocoa,
pimento, indigo, pepper and spices of all kinds, were carried, either directly to Europe, or were
first brought to the United States, and from thence exported in American vessels. . . . The
manufactures of Europe, and particularly of Great Britain, as well as the manufactures and
produce of the East-Indies and China, have also been imported, and again exported, in large
quantities, to the West-Indies, to the Spanish Colonies in South America, and elsewhere.  This
trade, which has been called the carrying trade, has, in some years, exceeded in value the trade of
the United States, in articles of domestic produce.”  Pitkin (1816), p. 136.
11  International shipping rates rose during the embargo, due to the added risk of
undertaking a voyage.  But the relevant data would be the price of domestic shipping services,
which presumably fell during the embargo.  Pitkin (1816, p. 391) reports that tonnage engaged in
the domestic costal trade rose 23 percent in 1808 from the previous year, as ships normally used
for overseas trade were transferred to local trade.
from Table 1.  This table also presents the value of imports for consumption, but government
statistics only report the breakdown between ad valorem and specific duties for total imports, not
imports for consumption.  The difference between total imports and imports for domestic
consumption is goods that were re-exported.  The working assumption will be that imports for
consumption are divided in the same proportion as total imports between those subject to
specific duties (40 percent) and ad valorem duties (60 percent).  It might be supposed that
imports subsequently re-exported consisted mainly of commodities from the West Indies (such
as sugar, coffee, etc.) that were subject to specific duties (and then rebated upon re-exportation),
but Pitkin (1816) indicates that re-exports also consisted of manufactures from Britain.
10 
As previously noted, the domestic price of imported commodities rose about 33 percent
as a result of the embargo, and the domestic price of exported goods fell 27 percent.  There is
little data available on domestic shipping rates between 1807 and 1808, although as Table 1
indicates shipping receipts fell less than domestic exports between 1807 and 1808.
11  Therefore,
in the absence of better information, the maintained assumption will be that the price of shipping- 11 -
services fell the same 27 percent as domestic exports.  
Thus, the embargo price vector is p1 = (0.73, 0.73, 1.33, 1.33).   The calculated value of -
p1@m0, which is also the estimated distance AD, is therefore $47 million.  
CD:  sP =  p1@(y1 - y0)
This component is somewhat more difficult to estimate.  This measures the shift along
the domestic production possibilities frontier – producing more of the goods previously imported
and producing less of the goods previously exported – as a result of the change in domestic
relative prices.  
The scope for producers in the United States to start or to increase domestic production
of previously imported goods (import substitution) depends upon the type of imported good. 
The ability of domestic firms to commence or increase production of manufactured goods, such
as cotton goods, glass, and iron, as a substitute for imports was quite substantial.  Conversely,
nearly half of imports consisted of consumption items such as sugar, coffee, tea, spices, wine and
spirits, goods in which East Coast producers could not easily initiate production. 
Unfortunately, unlike the export statistics, the import statistics of this period do not
completely enumerate the types of goods imported, but they can help establish the general range
of potential import substitution by domestic producers.  Imports subject to specific duties are
individually specified and consisted almost exclusively of the consumption goods mentioned
above (sugar, coffee, tea, wine, etc.) that domestic producers would have difficulty replicating. 
All other imports paying ad valorem duties were not separately recorded, but included (among
other items) manufactured goods, where the possibility of import substitution was presumably- 12 -
high.  As previously noted, about 40 percent of imports were subject to ad valorem duties.  
How much import substitution took place?  Not much was possible, given the short
duration of the embargo; over a longer horizon, domestic producers would have been able to
establish much higher levels of output of previously imported goods.  That said, the stimulus of
the embargo to domestic manufacturers (particularly around Philadelphia) was widely and
favorably noted at the time.  The city of Philadelphia apparently did well during the embargo,
not just because income lost by merchants was shifted partly to lawyers (who benefitted from the
proliferation of maritime-related law suits) but because manufacturing production expanded in
such goods as carpets, cloth (from bedspreads to stockings), earthenware, glass, soap, lead and
shot, and chemicals (Sears 1921).  As Frankel (1982, p. 301) notes, “There is historical evidence
that Americans were remarkably successful in 1808 at switching into the production of
manufactured goods when they were cut off from their usual source of supply.”  Sokoloff (1988)
reports a wave of patent activity coinciding with the embargo.
Other evidence suggests that domestic manufacturers elsewhere did not necessarily
prosper during the short period in which the embargo was in effect.  The records of textile
manufacturers in New England indicates that they suffered considerably with the sudden
collapse of trade.  According to Ware (1926, pp. 672, 677), these findings tend “to destroy the
theory that it was the embargo which, by cutting off foreign competition and throwing out of
employment labor and capital, gave the impetus and protection to the American industry which
enabled it to become firmly established. . . . By striking at the prosperity of the commercial
elements of the New England coast towns, it destroyed the purchasing power of the cotton
manufacturers’ chief market.”  - 13 -
12  See Irwin (2002), Figure 5.
Perhaps the most direct piece of evidence is from the Davis (2002) series on U.S.
industrial production during this period.  Davis’s overall industrial production index actually
collapsed in 1808, falling 17 percent from 1807.  However, the collapse was entirely due to the
fall in production by commercial and trade-dependent industries (such as merchant shipbuilding,
flour refining, fish curing, etc.) with virtually no change in the output of domestic infant
industries competing against imports (such as cotton and wool cloth production, etc.).
12 
Although this suggests that there was little immediate import substitution by domestic
manufacturers, the index fails to capture any increase in output from small producers, such as
local blacksmiths and glass blowers, household textile manufacturers, etc.  
Thus, information on production substitution is incomplete and the existing evidence is
mixed.  In terms of calculating the value of production substitution, one extreme assumption is
that the United States could replace one-for-one the quantity of the previously imported
manufactured goods (i.e., imports subject to ad valorem duties) with domestic production of
those goods at the higher autarky prices.  We also assume that domestic producers would not be
able to produce any imported goods subject to specific duties, including such commodities as
sugar, coffee, tea, wine, etc.  Symmetrically, domestic production of the exportable goods and
shipping services would be assumed to fall one-for-one with the decline in the exports of those
items.  In this one-for-one replacement case, then (y1 - y0) = (m1 - m0) with the non-ad valorem
imports zeroed out.  Because m1 = (-9.4/0.73, -23.0/0.73, 16.0/1.33, 29.1/1.33), or (-12.9, -31.5,
12.0, 21.9), then m1 - m0 = (35.8, 10.6, -22.0, -29.2) and therefore (y1 - y0) = (35.8, 10.6, -22.0,
0).  Then the net gain from the production shift is p1A(m1 - m0) = $4.7 million.  - 14 -
This one-for-one replacement assumption is extreme for assuming that domestic
production of manufactures could substitute perfectly for imports, and that domestic production
of exportables would fall as much as exports declined.  An alternative assumption is that
domestic producers could only produce half of the quantity of goods previously imported, and
were forced to reduce by half their production of goods previously exported.  In this case, (y1 -
y0) = 0.5A(m1 - m0) = (17.9, 0, 5.3, -20.2, 0), and the net gain from the production shift is p1A(m1 -
m0) = $2.3 million.  This case will be the central assumption, although the bounds on the welfare
cost will be explored using both full replacement and zero (substitution) replacement.
AB: sC = p1@x0 - e(p1,u0)
The absence of any consumption data make any estimate of the consumption substitution
virtually impossible.  The scope for consumption substitution was probably small:  it is unlikely
that domestic consumption of flour and tobacco would increase significantly because their prices
had fallen – and the prices of manufactures increased – due to the embargo.  It seems plausible to
assume that the scope for substitution in consumption is less than the scope for substitution in
production, which means that it would take a value of something less than $5 million.  As an
initial guess, we will take the value of $2.3 million, the same value as the substitution assumed to
be achieved by domestic producers. 
Alternatively, we can crudely simulate the value of consumption substitution with a
simple Cobb-Douglas utility function in which consumption is assumed to be 80 percent of GNP
and the expenditure share on imported manufactures is 30 percent.  Under Cobb-Douglas, the
elasticity of substitution is one, a higher value than is commonly used in computable general- 15 -
13  Recall as well that the customs figure for 1808 refer to October 1807 to September
1808 and cover a period when there was no embargo and when imports were still allowed in
despite the embargo.  The figure for 1809 (October 1808 to September 1809) cover six months
when the embargo was effective.  
14  Berry (1988) estimates that nominal GNP was $561 million in 1807.  Contemporaries
put the number much lower, as Niles has a 1814 estimate of $642 for 1814 and Beaujour has an
estimate of $197 to $350 million for the period 1800 to 1810.
equilibrium models.  This gives us an upper bound estimate on consumption substitution.  In this
case, the change in relative prices brings about consumption substitution valued at $3.2 million.
Other Components
The last two components of equation (4) are tariff revenue and net transfers in period 1. 
Tariff revenue -- expressed as (p1 - p1*)@m1 -- is not zero because some imports were allowed
into the country in early 1808.  The government reported tariff revenue to be $7.7 million in
1808, as noted on Table 1.
13  Net transfers (B1) is derived from the constraint in equation (2):  p1
(y1 - x1) + (p1 - p1*)@m1 + B1 = 0.  Solving for B1 in the year 1808 yields the figure of $1.5
million.  This helps correct for any distortion of the magnitude of the previous calculations due
to imbalanced trade.  
Table 2 presents the combined estimates of these various components of the welfare cost.
Column (1) presents the benchmark case using the figures calculated above.  The components
sum to $33 million dollars.  This welfare cost may be more usefully expressed as a percent of
GNP.  Gallman (2000, p. 7) reports a figure of $680 million for nominal GNP in 1807, which is
somewhat higher than other estimates but otherwise seems reasonable.
14  Taking this figure as a
rough benchmark, the welfare cost of the embargo was about 5 percent of GNP. - 16 -
What is a plausible range for this welfare cost?  The first component (p1m0) is a best
guess and does not change; this also applies to tariff revenue and to B1.  The production and
substitution components are subject to greater uncertainty.  Columns (2) and (3) present lower
and upper bound calculation based on assumptions about substitution.  Column (2) presents a
lower bound calculation in which domestic manufacturers can fully produce what was previously
imported and domestic farmers fully reduce production by the amount that exports decline.  This
increases sP from $2.3 to $4.7 million, decreasing the welfare cost to $28 million, or 4 percent of
GNP.  Columns (3) an alternative, higher bound calculations on the magnitude of the welfare
loss in which there is no production or consumption substitution at all.  This increases the
welfare cost to $38 million, or 5.5 percent of GNP. 
These alternative calculations provide some plausible bounds on the likely true welfare
cost of the embargo.  The welfare cost appears to be centered around 5 percent of GNP, but
could be as low as 4 percent or as high as something closer to 6 percent.  In 1807, merchandise
exports and net shipping receipts were about 13 percent of GNP.  
In two classic papers on the cost of protection, Johnson (1960, 1965) presents some
different calculations that lend some support to these magnitudes.  Johnson (1965) used a
constant elasticity of substitution utility function and a general specification for the production
transformation curve to arrive at the costs of self-sufficiency (autarky) in a computable two-
sector general equilibrium model.  In the case where the share of national income spent on
importables under free trade is 0.20 and the elasticity of substitution in consumption between
importables and exportables is 0.5, for example, then a tariff of 76 percent would be sufficient to
induce autarky at a welfare loss of 5.2 percent of free trade utility level.  If the elasticity of- 17 -
substitution is 1.0, then the self-sufficiency tariff is 53 percent and the welfare loss is 4.0 percent. 
These figures are remarkably close to the actual findings in this paper.  Given that the calculation
is performed in a similar general equilibrium setting, perhaps this should not be too surprising.
Johnson (1960) also derived the commonly used partial equilibrium measure of the cost
of protection as a percent of GDP as ½ " 0 (J/(1+J)
2, where " is the ratio of imports to GDP in
the (initial) equilibrium, 0 is the absolute value of the arc elasticity of import demand, and J is
the average ad valorem tariff rate.  In the present case, the ratio of imports to GDP is
approximately 0.13, and if we assume that the absolute value of the elasticity of import demand
is 2 and that the tariff rate is 70 percent, then the cost of protection is 2.2 percent of GDP.  As is
commonly pointed out, this partial equilibrium formula yields relatively small figures for the
cost of protection.  
Thus, the massive disruption of trade caused by the embargo imposed a substantial one-
year loss on the U.S. economy, one that was not just a small fraction of a percent of GNP.  There
is no doubt that 1808 was a difficult year for the U.S. economy.  Berry’s (1988) real GNP
estimates fall 4.7 percent between 1807 and 1808.  The year has been called a “depression” by
Thorp (1926, p. 116), who gives it the following description:  “rigid embargo causes paralysis on
coast, gradually spreading inland; severe distress in New England; further sharp decline in
commodity prices to low point, third quarter; foreign trade completely checked.”  
It is difficult to consider the policy of embargo a success, given the cost it imposed on the
economy while failing to achieve its objective of changing British and French policy toward
American shipping.  One person who almost perfectly anticipated the results of the embargo was
Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury.  Writing in 1794, Hamilton was- 18 -
prescient about the potential impact of any trade embargo: “The consequences of so great and so
sudden a disturbance of our Trade which must affect our exports as well as our Imports are not to
be calculated.  An excessive rise in the price of foreign commodities – a proportional decrease of
price and demand for our own commodities – the derangement of our revenue and credit – these
circumstances united may occasion the most dangerous dissatisfaction & disorders in the
community and may drive the governt. to a disgraceful retreat – independent of foreign causes”
(Syrett 1961, Vol. 16, p. 275). 
Hamilton proved correct not just about trade and revenue effect of the embargo, but about
the domestic disorder it caused and the eventual retreat of the government:  New England
grumbled about secession and the growing domestic discontent with the embargo, and the
increasing willingness of merchants to violate it, led to its repeal without it having accomplished
any change in British policy.  The political opposition generated by the embargo can be
illustrated by studying Congressional votes on the embargo.  Table 3 shows the pattern of voting
across regions on the imposition and retention of the embargo in the House of Representatives. 
The partisan division on the issue is readily apparent: Federalists completely opposed the
measure, while the Jeffersonian Republicans initially supported it but later opposed it.  The table
shows that Republican support for the embargo was completely lost in New England and the
Mid-Atlantic states.  New England merchants were most vocal in opposing the embargo, while
in the Mid-Atlantic the losses to merchants and the farming community (in terms of foregone
income and lower land prices) surely exceeded the gains to those starting manufacturing
establishments.
Given that the major export crops came from the South, one might have expected strong- 19 -
opposition to the embargo in that region.  Yet in the February 1809 vote, members from the
South were evenly divided about whether to retain the embargo or not.  Jennings (1921) notes
several factors that may have muted Southern opposition to the embargo: the suspension of
bankruptcy laws, the non-perishability of Southern crops, and the deep seated hatred of Great
Britain.  Despite these factors, there was little support in Congress for continuing the embargo in
early 1809.
4.  Conclusions
This paper has used the “natural experiment” of America’s trade embargo of 1807-1809
to calculate the total static losses from forgoing virtually all international trade.  While the
United States did not achieve complete autarky in 1808, it came as close to economic isolation as
it ever has in its history.  The best guess calculation of the static welfare cost of the embargo is
about 5 percent of GNP.  The cost does not represent the total gains from trade, however,
because the initial trading equilibrium was one of restricted trade.  Still, the embargo inflicted
substantial costs on the economy while it was in effect.- 20 -
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Table 1: Selected U.S. International Transactions, 1807-1809
Figures in millions of dollars.



















1807 48.7 42.1 90.8 57.8 86.9 59.6 85.1 17.0
1808 9.4 23.0 32.4 21.2 36.9 13.0 45.1 7.7
1809 31.4 26.2 57.6 28.5 32.5 20.8 40.2 7.4
Source: North (1960), p. 600;  Pitkin (1816), pp. 36, 252; Irwin (2002), Table 1.- 23 -
Table 2:  Welfare Effects of the 1808 Trade Embargo







p1@m0 (46.9) (46.9) (46.9)
(p1 - p1*)@m1 7.7 7.7 7.7
B1 1.5 1.5 1.5
sP =  p1@(y1 - y0) 2.3 4.7 0
sC = p1@x0 - e(p1,u0) 2.3 4.7 0
Total (33.1) (28.3) (37.7)
As Percent of GNP 4.9% 4.2% 5.5%
Source: See text for calculations.  Nominal GNP in 1807 is assumed to be $680 million, from
Gallman (2000), p. 7.  The share of domestic exports and shipping earnings in GNP was 13.4
percent in 1807; the share of imports for domestic consumption in GNP was 12.5 percent in that
year.- 24 -
Table 3: Voting in the House of Representatives on the Embargo
A.  The Imposition of the Embargo, December 21, 1807
Republicans Federalists Total
Region Yea Nay Yea Nay Yea Nay
New England 19 0 0 15 19 15
Mid Atlantic 27 7 0 9 27 16
S o u t h 2 8 1 00 22 8 1 2
W e s t 820082
T o t a l 8 21 9 0 2 68 24 5
B.  The Retention of the Embargo, February 24, 1809
Republicans Federalists Total
Region Yea Nay Yea Nay Yea Nay
New England 1 13 0 15 1 28
Mid Atlantic 10 27 0 6 10 33
S o u t h 1 8 1 60 21 8 1 8
W e s t 430043
T o t a l 3 35 9 0 2 33 38 2
Note: This vote is on an amendment to eliminate all passages from a bill that would repeal the
embargo.  A vote in favor is thus a vote to retain the embargo.  The final bill that actually
repealed the embargo replaced it with non-intercourse restrictions on trade and was passed in a
partisan vote, with Federalists opposing the continuation of any restrictions on trade.  Source:
Voteview, from www.princeton.edu/~voteview/
Classification:  New England includes Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, and Connecticut.  Mid Atlantic includes New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware,
and Maryland.  South includes Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.  West












Figure 1: Tonnage of American Ships Entering Great Britain, 1801-1810
 
Source: Great Britain.  “An Account Relating to Imports and Exports,” February 18, 1812,































Figure 2: U.S. Merchandise Trade, 1800-1815




























<-- Embargo Period -->
Figure 3: Domestic Wholesale Prices of Exported Commodities, Monthly 1807-1809
Source: Cole (1938).  Prices are of Georgia upland cotton at New York, superfine flour at New



















<-- Embargo Period -->
Figure 4: Domestic Wholesale Prices of Imported Commodities, Monthly 1807-1809
Sources:  Smith and Cole (1935), p. 147, and Bezanson, Gray, and Hussey (1936), p. 353.  The
Boston index is a weighted average of prices on 18 imported commodities.  The Philadelphia
index is a weighted average of prices of 59 imported commodities. - 29 -
Figure 5: The Gains from Trade